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CASENOTE

COY V. IOWA: THE EFFECT OF A
FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION
REQUIREMENT ON STATUTES
SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1988 the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to physical, face-to-face confrontation with an adverse2
witness while that witness testifies at trial.' Thus, in Coy v. Iowa,
the screen, which obstructed only the child witnesses' view of the
defendant, 3 was held unconstitutional. 4 Before Coy, the Court essentially limited its holdings in this area to guarantee the defendant a
right to cross-examine the witness5 and, in turn, preclude the use of

1. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
2. Id.
3. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986).
4. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
5. E.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (the Supreme Court stated
"that a primary interest secured by [the confrontation clause] is the right of crossexamination" (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965))).
Cross-examination is the questioning of a witness called by the opposing party.
See CAL. Evm. CODE § 761 (West 1989). The right grew out of the use of witnesses
at trial. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1364, at 15 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter
5 WIGMORE]; see also infra text accompanying notes 40-42. In the 1600s, as the
testimony of live witnesses at trial was just beginning to be used as evidence, questions
arose as to the accuracy of the witness' statements. See 5 WIGMORE, supra, § 1364,
at 15; see also Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HAav. L. Rv. 957, 958 (1974)
[hereinafter Tribe]. Gradually, courts realized that questioning by the defendant was
effective in ensuring accurate testimony. See 5 WIoMoRE, supra, § 1364, at 15. Crossexamination has become the primary tool for uncovering untruthfulness and motivations to fabricate. See id. In addition, cross-examination is used to expose inaccuracies in a witness' recollection and impairments to the witness' perception of the
event to which he testifies. See Tribe, supra, at 958.
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certain hearsay statements 6 as evidence at trial. While the requirement
of a physical, face-to-face meeting at trial was fleetingly mentioned
in prior opinions, 7 the full extent of the confrontation clause protec6. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (The trial court admitted as
evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the prosecution's key witness. Because
the defendant did not have a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
the hearing, the Supreme Court held that admitting the prior statements violated the
defendant's right to confrontation.).
'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
FED. R. Evnj. 801(c). Several broad exceptions to the rule against its admission
permit the use of hearsay as evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 803, 804. In the context of
the confrontation clause, the problem with hearsay evidence is that it merely repeats
an earlier, out-of-court statement. Therefore, the statement is subject to four dangers
of all testimony: 1) the statement may be ambiguous; 2) the speaker may not have
been sincere or may have had a reason to lie; 3) the speaker may not have remembered
the event accurately when he later spoke about it; or 4) the speaker may not have
been able to see, hear, smell, touch, or taste accurately because some obstacle to his
perception of the fact to which the statement refers. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 5,
at 958. Although all testimony is subject to these dangers, if the assertion is made
by a witness at trial, the criminal defendant can protect himself from the dangers by
cross-examining the witness. The defendant can question the declarant/witness on
the stand about any motivation the declarant may have to lie, the quality of the
declarant's memory, and obstacles to the declarant's perception of the event. See id.
However, when the witness merely repeats what he has overheard or what he himself
said out of court, a defendant's attack on the accuracy of the statement is limited to
questioning whether the testifying witness actually heard or made the statement.
Statements not spoken from the witness stand are often not subject to the protections
ensuring an in-court assertion's reliability. See id. While there are many exceptions
which allow hearsay into evidence, most are based on the presumption that the
circumstances under which the statement was made provide either a sufficient
alternative to the cross-examination protection or other checks on its reliability. See
id. at 961-65; see, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(1), (2) advisory committee's note (hearsay
statements are admissible when the declarant described an event while it happened
or made the statement in a state of excitement after an event; these are presumed
reliable because the speaker had no time to think of a lie).
7. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) ("The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right
physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination.") (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985)); Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) ("The Confrontation Clause advances [the safeguards of
an open and public trial] by ensuring that convictions will not be based on the charges
of unseen and unknown . . . individuals."); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial, and that 'a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of crossexamination."') (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) ("Confrontation means more than being allowed
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tions remained unresolved.' Although the Supreme Court has finally
answered the inevitable confrontation clause issue, the decision has
simultaneously introduced several other questions.

While the Supreme Court expands the defendant's confrontation
rights, state legislatures are attempting to shield children from the
trauma of testifying in the presence of defendants accused of sexually
abusing them. 9 Many state statutes now provide for a child victim's
to confront the witness physically."); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985)

(per curiam) ("[C]ases involving the admission of out-of-court statements ... [reflect]

the Court's longstanding recognition that the 'literal right to 'confront' the witness
at the time of trial ...

forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation

Clause."') (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("Our own decisions seem to have recognized at an
early date that it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that

forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause ....") (citing

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47,
55 (1899) ("[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be
proved against an accused . .. except by witnesses who confront him at the trial,

upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross examine, and
whose testimony he may impeach ...."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,

242-43 (1895) (the object of the confrontation clause was to guarantee "crossexamination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity... of compelling
[the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief").
8. See Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U.

L. REv. 207, 209 (1984) [hereinafter Lilly]. The scope of the confrontation
clause remained largely unresolved, in part, because most of the litigation surrounding
the clause questioned limitations on the right of cross-examination and the admission
of hearsay evidence. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (woman's
preliminary hearing testimony was admissible against defendant accused of theft
because defendant was able to cross-examine the woman at the prior hearing); Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (hearsay evidence of co-defendant's confession
admitted to prove defendant's participation in murder violated defendant's right to
confrontation because defendant was unable to cross-examine her co-defendant);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (prohibiting the mention of a juvenile witness'
prior conviction during defendants' cross examination violated defendants' right to
confrontation); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (transcript of prior
testimony given in front of defendant at his first trial is admitted at defendant's
second trial because witness died; defendant was able to cross-examine the witness at
the prior hearing).
9. The immaturity and vulnerability of children make them especially likely
to suffer psychological harm when forced to testify in court. See, e.g., Labai, The
FLA.

Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offence in the Criminal Justice System,

15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 982 (1969) [hereinafter Labai]. One study found that 73%
of the children involved in a court proceeding against a sex offender were psychologically distressed afterwards. See id. at 982. In fact many sexual assaults on children
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testimony to be videotaped for trial or broadcast live into courtrooms
via closed-circuit television. I0 Although these statutes permit the dego unpunished because parents refuse to press charges for fear that testifying will
jeopardize the psychological health of the child. See Note, The Testimony of Child
Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv.
806, 807 (1985). Many researchers lay the blame for this emotional traumatization
on the repetitive procedures of the criminal process, see, e.g., Parker, The Rights of
Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector of Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. Rlv.
643, 646 (1982) [hereinafter Parker] (the victim is not allowed to forget the horror),
as well as the necessity of having to face the perpetrator. See id.; Labai, supra, at
984. Some psychiatrists insist that avoiding the face-to-face meeting of the defendant
and victim will lessen the degree of trauma the young victim will suffer and actually
increase the reliability of the child's testimony. See Labai, supra, at 979.
10. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989) (The court may permit the state to
videotape the deposition of a sexual offense victim who is under 16 years old upon
a showing of "good cause." The defendant must be present during the taping and
the deposition is to be conducted as if the witness was testifying at trial. Unless the
tape "will unfairly prejudice the defendant," it may be used at trial instead of the
witness' live testimony.); ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989) (The testimony of a
sexual offense victim may be projected into the courtroom, to the jury, via closedcircuit television. During the testimony, the defendant is allowed in the room with
the witness.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989) (The preliminary hearing
testimony of a victim of a sex crime who is under 16 may be videotaped. The tape
will be used at trial in lieu of live testimony upon a showing "that further testimony
would cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim is medically unavailable
....
"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989) (California permits a victim of
a sexual offense, who is under 10 years old, to testify from another room via twoway, closed-circuit television. This procedure can only be used if the child is found
to be unable to testify in person because certain listed circumstances surrounding the
crime have had a "substantial" effect on the child. The statute explicitly provides
that the defendant appear on the monitor in the witness' chamber and that the child
may enter the courtroom to identify the defendant.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5486g (West Supp. 1989) (The court may order that a sexual abuse victim, under 13,
testify via closed-circuit television or that a previously made videotape be used in lieu
of live testimony. Although the defendant will be allowed to see and hear the child,
the court is to remove the defendant from the child's view.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
92.53, 92.54 (West Supp. 1989) (In sexual abuse trials, Florida permits videotaping
(§ 92.53) and closed-circuit transmission of a child's testimony (§ 92.54) when "there
is a substantial likelihood that a victim or witness who is under the age of 16 would
suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm if he were required to testify in
open court .

. . ."

In addition, the defendant may be removed from the view of the

child during the testimony.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986) (The court
may order either videotaping or two-way, closed-circuit transmission of the testimony
of a victim of sexual abuse who is under 10 years old. However, the court must find
the procedure necessary. Sufficient necessity is established when either, in the opinion
of a psychiatrist, in-court testimony would be traumatic or independent evidence
shows "that it is more likely than not that [in-court testimony] would be a traumatic
experience for the child." In these cases, the defendant should not be seen or heard
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fendant to see and hear the child during taping or broadcasting, many
by the child while testifying, unless he is acting as his own attorney.); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989) (Child victim of sexual abuse may testify via
closed-circuit television. While the defendant is allowed to hear and see the child, he
may be restricted to view from "an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror."
However, the witness is to be told that the defendant is watching and listening.);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1989) (The court may order the
testimony of a child victim of abuse to be transmitted into the courtroom via closedcircuit television only if the court finds courtroom testimony "will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate." The defendant, if represented by counsel, is not to be in the same room as
the child, but may view the child from the courtroom.); MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-103.1 (Supp. 1989) (Maryland makes a special statutory hearsay
exception for a child abuse victim's statements, drawings, and other nonverbal
conduct made to a physician, psychologist, social worker, or teacher. Such evidence
will be admitted if the child testifies in court or under the provisions of § 9-102 or
if the child is unavailable because of her "[ilnability to communicate about the
alleged offense due to serious emotional distress." In addition the statement must
possess certain "[plarticularized guarantees of trustworthiness" which are defined in
the considerations of several factors surrounding the making of the statement.); N.Y.
CaM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (New York's experimental
statutes were due to expire on November 1, 1988). According to the Practice
Commentaries and the details of the statute, the legislature purposefully attempted
to balance the defendant's confrontation right with the countervailing public policy
of "reducing the mental and emotional strain upon child witnesses." Id. practice
commentary at 407. The statutes accomplish this by providing for two-way, closedcircuit televised testimony of sexually abused child witnesses under the age of 13. To
hold such a procedure necessary, the court must find "by clear and convincing
evidence that it is likely, as a result of extraordinary circumstances, that such child
witnesses will suffer severe mental or emotional harm if required to testify [in court]."
Id. at § 65.10(l). The extraordinary circumstances justifying such a holding are listed
in § 65.20(9) and include any aggravating circumstances surrounding the offence
(such as threats, use of weapons, or physical injury to the child) as well as the age
of the child and the relationship between the child and defendant. Id. at § 65.20(9).
§ 65.20(12) requires that the court explicitly find that a physical face-to-face encounter
between the defendant and the witness "will contribute to the likelihood that the
child witness will suffer severe mental and emotional harm" before keeping the
defendant from the room where the child is testifying. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
65.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1989). If such a finding is made, the defendant must be
on the monitor the child is watching. Id. at § 65.30(2).); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3515.5(2), (3) (Supp. 1989) (The Utah statute provides for both closed-circuit televised
testimony and videotaped testimony to be presented to the jury if the witness is under
14 and the victim of sexual abuse. The statute requires "good cause" for the use of
each. Also, the defendant will be permitted to physically face the young witness
unless it is found that "the child will suffer serious emotional or mental strain ...
or the child's testimony will be inherently unreliable if he is required to testify in the
defendant's presence." If the defendant is excluded from the child's view, the child
is to be informed that the defendant is listening.).
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allow courts to block the child's view of the defendant." The decision
in Coy, requiring adverse witnesses be able to look upon the criminal

defendant, now calls into question the validity of these statutes.

This note will examine the impact of the significance the Coy

majority placed on face-to-face testimony. First, this Note will over-

view the history of face-to-face confrontation and the reasons for the
adoption of the confrontation clause in the sixth amendment. In
addition, it will examine the Supreme Court's past construction of

the confrontation clause as guaranteeing the right of cross-examination. It will then discuss Coy v. Iowa, 2 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause requires an adverse

witness be able to look upon a criminal defendant while testifying. 3
Finally, analysis will reveal two possible interpretations of the Coy
decision. A broad interpretation, based on the significance the majority attributed to accusing a person to his face, 4 would rarely, if ever,

permit an abridgement of physical, face-to-face confrontation. On
the other hand, a narrow interpretation, limiting Coy's holding to the
fact that the trial court in Coy did not specifically find the procedure
necessary,

5

would allow exceptions to the face-to-face requirement in

furtherance of important public policies.' 6 Thus, under a narrow
interpretation, the state's interest in protecting child witnesses may

permit many of these procedures to be implemented without violating
the criminal defendant's constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation.

II. HISTORY
Historical research of the right to confrontation does not reveal
whether face-to-face confrontation was intended by the sixth amend11. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-86g (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53, 92.54 (West Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986); IowA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West
Supp. 1989); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. CRIM.
ANN.

PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(2),
(3) (Supp. 1989). For specific provisions of these statutes, see supra note 10.
12. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
13. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988).
14. See infra notes 172-184 and accompanying text.
15. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803; State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa
1986).
16. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 ("We leave for another day, however, the
question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be
allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy.").
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ment. 17 There are at least two reasons for this. First, little material
exists on the origins of the constitutional right of confrontation."8
Second, the existing literature focuses on the common law development of the right of cross-examination and the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence, rather than on the face-to-face nature
of confrontation.19 Yet the development of the cross-examination
right and the rule against hearsay provides a sense of their important
roles throughout history.
A.

EARLY ENGLISH COMMON LAW

After the barbaric trials by ordeal and battle 20 were abolished in
1215,21 England adopted the jury trial from the ecclesiastical and civil
laws of France. 22 The early jury, 23 however, did not engage in the

same fact finding process as occurs today. 24 Instead, the medieval
jury either investigated the facts by questioning people throughout
the countryside or relied on the prosecutor's account of what hap-

17. See Graham, The Right of Confrontationand the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Cgam. L. BULL. 99, 103-04 (1972); see also Lilly, supra
note 8, at 208.
18. Graham, supra note 17, at 104.
19. See, e.g., 5 WIMORE, supra note 5, § 1364 (part of the history of the
confrontation clause is found in the section on the history of the hearsay rule); see
also Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB.
L. 381 (1959).
20. Trials by ordeal and battle appealed to God for the truth. If the defendant's
trial was by ordeal, he was forced to perform a task which would injure him, such
as extract a rock from a pot of boiling water. If the wound healed within three days,
God had proclaimed his innocence. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 385. Likewise, if
the trial was by battle, the survivor of the clash prevailed in his claim. See id. at
386. For a discussion on the right to confrontation during this period, see Pollitt,
supra note 19, at 385-86.
21. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 323 (7th ed. 1956 &
photo. reprint 1966) [hereinafter 1 HOLDSWORTH].
22. Id. at 314-17. For a detailed study of the influx and development of the
jury, see H.

INSTITUTIONS,

POTTER, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS

240-48 (4th ed. 1958).

23. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.

24. Today, the jury relies solely on the facts presented to them by the opposing
parties at trial. Independent investigation by a juror may lead to a reversal of the
jury's verdict. E.g., Heaver v. Ward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 386 N.E.2d 134 (1979)
(jury's reliance on jury foreman's independent investigation of the scene of the
accident, foreman's diagram, and a driving handbook the foreman brought into
deliberations required reversal of the jury's verdict).
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pened. 25 Because the jury was free to get its information from unsubstantiated sources, judges feared the parties would attempt to influence
the verdict by hiring third persons to inform the jury. 26 In response
to this fear, the common law created a civil action for damages called

"maintenance.'

'27

"Maintenance" could be brought by a party against a person
who voluntarily approached the jury with any adverse information
regarding the case. 2 This had a prohibitive effect on even disinterested
witnesses testifying at trial. 29 Only if the judge requested the witness
to inform the jury could he escape a charge of maintenance.30 In
practice, though, the courts rarely called a witness because there was
no established procedure for commanding her appearance.'
Apparently, little thought was given to any type of confrontation
during this very early period as jurors acquired much of their information from sources outside the courtroom, and informed persons
were discouraged from volunteering information.12 As a result, parties
were unable to challenge the accuracy of information gathered in this
manner.33 The dangers of this system eventually became obvious.
Thus, courts began to develop procedures to curb the possibility that
verdicts might be based on insufficient or untrustworthy evidence.
Gradually, English courts realized that crucial information might
be escaping the jury's inquiry.34 During the fifteenth century, the
25. See 5 WIOMORE, supra note 5, § 1364, at 15. The idea of God as judge

carried over from trial by ordeal, see supra note 20, through this period. The early
jury was able to gather the facts in most any way it wished. The judge could say

very little about the fact-finding process because the jury's verdict was seen as inspired
by God. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 181 (3rd ed. 1944 &
photo. reprint 1966) [hereinafter 9 HOLDSWORTH]; see also I HOLDSWORTH, supra

note 21, at 317.
26. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 182.
27. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDEN E § 2190, at 63-64 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
[hereinafter 8 WIGMOR ].

28. Id.
29. See 9

HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 182.
30. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2190, at 64.
31. Id.
32. See 5 WIOMOaa, supra note 5, § 1364, at 15.
33. Pollitt, supra note 19, at 386-87. See also supra notes 5-6. Prior to 1562
the protection afforded a criminal defendant was to challenge individual jurors and
exclude them from the jury if they were biased or had a poor reputation for honesty.

Pollitt, supra note 19, at 386. In addition, the defendant could challenge the verdict
by calling a second jury to determine the same issue. A different decision by the
second jury would reverse the prior verdict. Id. at 387. This was perhaps the criminal
defendant's only type of confrontation protection.

34. See 8

WIGMORE,

supra note 27, § 2190, at 64-65. For a detailed account of
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English courts of equity developed a procedure for calling witnesses
to testify within the courtroom.35 Yet, the civil jury continued to base
its findings primarily on self-obtained information until the statute of
1562 allowed parties in all civil proceedings to command an individual's appearance at the trial. 36 Later, the criminal courts adopted
this procedure, but solely for the benefit of the prosecution. 37 When
the witness' presence was compelled, he was no longer subject to a
charge of maintenance because the law then required him to testify.38
Thus, the juries of each court slowly began to depend on the evidence
39
and testimony presented at trial for their decision.
When the jury began gathering the facts within the courtroom,
the judges and parties were better able to control and decide for
themselves the adequacy of the evidence. 4° Dean Wigmore, in his
treatise on evidence, summarized the effect of the change in the fact
finding process on the concept of credibility:
Juries were just beginning to depend for their verdict upon
what was laid before them at trial, and it was thus natural
that they should begin to ask themselves, and to be urged by
counsel to consider whether they had been furnished with
sufficient material for a right decision. Much began to be

the gradual use of juries as fact finders, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 17784.
35. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 183-84.
36. Statute of Elizabeth, 1562-63, 5 Eliz., ch. 9, § 12, quoted in 8 WIGMORE,
EVIENCE § 2190 at 65 n.17 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The statute provided that:
If any person or persons upon whom any process out of the courts of record
within this realm . . . shall be served to testify or depose concerning any
cause or matter depending in any of the same courts ... do not appear

Id.

according to the tenor of the said process, having not a lawful and reasonable
let or impediment to the contrary, that then the party making default shall
forfeit £10 and give further recompense for the harm suffered by the party
aggrieved.

37. See 8 WIoMORE, supra note 27, § 2190, at 67. Criminal defendants were
not extended this privilege until the beginning of the 17th century. See 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 27, § 2190, at 67. Because the witnesses called by a defendant are usually
in his favor, the confrontation clause's right to confront adverse witnesses, see U.S.
CoNST. amend. VI, is not significantly implicated. The history of the compulsory
process clause (the right to call witnesses in one's favor) is beyond the scope of this
discussion. For further inquiry, see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2190, at 66-67.
38. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2190, at 66.
39. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 387.
40. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 225.
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thought and said, in statutes and otherwise, about having
4
witnesses . . . 'good and sufficient.' '
The increased reliance on and importance of the witness' credibility
eventually led to questioning of that credibility by the opposing party.

In turn, such questioning became a vital tool in testing a witness'

credibility. This procedure was eventually elevated to a right of cross-

examination, at least for criminal defendants.42

Before witnesses began regularly offering evidence and testimony
in court, rules controlling the presentation of evidence were not
contemplated.4 3 However, once the judiciary became more concerned
with proof, checks on the sufficiency of evidence were needed. For
example, some statutes mandated specific numbers of witnesses testify
for various criminal convictions." Also, certain people, such as the
parties and their spouses, were not permitted to testify because their
interest in the outcome of litigation greatly increased the likelihood
45
their testimony would be slanted.

Despite the increasingly important role credibility played at trial,
hearsay evidence continued to be admitted throughout the mid 1500s
to the late 1600s. 46 However, the judiciary began to recognize that

41. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1364, at 15.
42. See id.
43. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 225.
44. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 388 n.26 (quoting I Eliz., ch. 1, § 37 (1558)
(two witnesses required for conviction of treason)). Requiring a specific number of
witnesses was borrowed from the civil law and English ecclesiastical law. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 203-04.
45. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 194-97.
46. See 5 WIGMoRE, supra note 5, § 1364, at 17. This was especially true in
trials of those accused of treason. Because of the government's instability and inability
to retain power, the judiciary often disregarded statutes requiring two witnesses for
a treason conviction. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 388-89. Allegations of treason
were, therefore, often proven through affidavits, depositions, and accomplices'
confessions. See 1 J. STEPHEN, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 325-26
(1973); see also Pollitt, supra note 19, at 388 (accomplices' confessions were often
acquired through torture). Take, for example, the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.
Raleigh was found guilty of treason solely on the torture-induced confession of
Cobham, his alleged accomplice. STEPHEN, supra, at 333-34. Knowing that Cobham
had retracted his confession, Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought to trial to testify.
Id. at 334. The judges denied his request saying that such laws were "inconvenient"
and would result in the release of many criminals. Id. Consequently, Raleigh was
found guilty and executed. Pollitt, supra note 19, at 389.
Sir Walter Raleigh's trial is frequently cited by authors discussing sixth amendment confrontation. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1364, at 17; Pollitt, supra
note 19, at 388-89. Some authors even credit the inclusion of the confrontation clause
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hearsay "was inferior to evidence given from a party's own knowledge
,,47 because its accuracy could not be tested by questioning the
. . .
speaker. 48 It was not until the late9 1600s that the rule against admitting
4
hearsay was firmly established.
The early development of cross-examination and the rule against
hearsay in England reveals their important roles in the courtroom.
Both developed to ensure the evidence supporting a verdict would be
accurate.50 Yet this development does not reveal whether a right to
physical face-to-face confrontation might have developed concurrently
with the right to cross-examination and the rule against hearsay.
Unfortunately, America's implementation of cross-examination and
the rule against hearsay is similarly inconclusive.
B.

COLONIAL HISTORY

The American colonists brought with them much of the English
common law, including a right of cross-examination and the rule
against hearsay.51 These rights were thought to be so important that
many of the colonies' charters explicitly granted defendants the right
to call and question witnesses.5 2 Although English common law estabin the sixth amendment to the injustice of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial. Compare
Goldman, Not so "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66
N.C.L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1987) ("[T]he confrontation clause ... originated in reaction to
the outrageous trial ... of Sir Walter Raleigh.") with Graham, supra note 17, at

100 n.4 (crediting Sir Walter Raleigh with the confrontation clause is "a convenient

but highly romantic myth ....

).

47. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 216.
48. See id. at 218-19.
The purpose of cross-examination is to uncover flaws in a witness' sincerity,
memory, and perception of what he states as fact. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 958.
If the statement made on the stand simply reports what another has said, the
opponent can only challenge whether the witness actually heard the statement
correctly. He is not able to adequately challenge whether any flaws existed in the
speaker's sincerity, memory, or perception which may render the statement inaccurate.
See id. For a more detailed explanation, see supra notes 5-6.
49. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 217; see also 5 WIGMORE, supra note
5, § 1364, at 23 n.47 (after Raleigh's trial, courts consistently excluded hearsay). But
see Pollitt, supra note 19, at 389-90 (in 1640, England's new parliament declared the
trial of a political dissenter, John Lilbourn, illegal because he was not afforded the
right to cross-examine his accusers; after Lilbourn's trial, English courts fully
recognized the "right to confrontation").
50. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49; notes 5-6.
51. See Lilly, supra note 8, at 212.
52. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 393-95 (the charters of New York, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania provided for the right to call and question witnesses).
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lished the basis for American justice, other historical factors obviated
the inclusion of the confrontation clause in the Constitution.
After the French and Indian War,53 England found itself deep in
debt, and Parliament looked to the colonies for reimbursement. 54
First, Parliament began enforcing laws which forbade the colonies to
trade with any country other than England." Then, Parliament heavily
taxed many of the products shipped to the colonies.16 To ease enforcement, the government promised high rewards and anonymity in
exchange for information on smuggling operations." The colonists'
sympathy with the smugglers and anger over the taxes made prosecution of smugglers difficult in the colonies.5" The trials, therefore,
were moved to Halifax, where few defendants and witnesses were able
to appear.5 9
The colonists' outrage at the injustices of their former government
was evident when, several years after the Revolutionary War, the
Second Continental Congress was formed to strengthen the Articles
of Confederation. 60 Although the Second Continental Congress failed
to include specific protections from many injustices suffered by the
colonists before the war, their absence did not go unnoticed. For
example, at the Massachusetts convention one delegate commented
on the lack of procedural protections for criminal defendants:
The mode of trial is altogether undetermined-whether the
criminal is to be allowed the benefit of counsel; whether he is
to be allowed to meet his accuser face-to-face; whether he is
to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantages of cross examination, we are not yet told. 61
53. The French and Indian War grew out of conflict between France and
England over control of the Ohio Valley. This war is credited with the expansion of
English colonies over most of North America. For further discussion, see R. HARLOW,
THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 114-25 (rev. 1933).
54. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 396.
55. See id. at 395-96.

56. See id. at 396. The Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and the Townshend Act
taxed such things as sugar, glass, and tea. The tax on tea eventually led to the famous
Boston tea party.
57. See id.
58. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 396. Despite convincing evidence of guilt,
jurors would often acquit the smuggler. Judges also did their part by scheduling trial
when the prosecutor was indisposed. Id.
59. See Pollitt, supra note 19, at 397.
60. See HARLOW, supra note 53, at 198.
61. Pollitt, supra note 19, at 399 (quoting ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 124-25 (1836)).
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Many states refused to ratify the new constitution, in part, because
of such omissions.62 Thus, the sixth amendment's guarantee that "[iln

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be

confronted with the witnesses against him . .. 63became part64 of the
compromise which led to the ratification of the Constitution.
C.

CASE HISTORY

One of the Supreme Court's first decisions construing the confrontation clause was in Mattox v. United States.65 In Mattox, the
Court held admitting the testimony of two deceased witnesses from a
defendant's first trial into evidence at his second trial did not violate
the confrontation clause.6 Although the Court mentioned a face-toface requirement, confrontation was primarily discussed as being
between the witness and the jury. 67 The Court explained that the
confrontation clause compels the witness "to stand face-to-face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor . . . whether he is worthy of belief." ' 68 Because the defendant was able to cross-examine, and the first jury was able to assess
the credibility of the witnesses at his first trial, 69 the Court held the
defendant's rights were preserved.7 0 The Court observed that although
the defendant was technically deprived of his right, "general rules of
law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case." ' 7' The Court reasoned that the
public's safety interest could not tolerate the release of a convicted
murderer simply because72the prosecution's witnesses had died before
testifying a second time.
62. See id.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See id.; see also HARLOW, supra note 53, at 241-43.
156 U.S. 237 (1895).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
See id. at 242-43. The Court did make one brief reference to the defendant's

facing the witness, stating, "The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to
face, and subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination." Id. at 244. The primary
discussion, however, revolved around the jury's assessment of the reliability of the
witness' testimony. See id. at 242-43.
68. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).

69.
jury. See
70.
71.
72.

It is unclear how the first jury's assessment of credibility aided the second
id.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243.
See id.
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It was not until 1970 that the Court attempted to explicitly list
the purposes of the confrontation clause. In California v. Green, 73
the Court held that admitting a witness' preliminary hearing testimony
to refresh his memory did not violate the confrontation clause. 74 The
defendant contended that the witness' memory lapse prevented him
from adequately cross-examining the witness at the trial. The Court
replied that the confrontation clause "(1) insures that the witness will
give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter ... ; (2) forces the witness to submit to crossexamination ...; [and] (3) permits the jury ... to observe the
demeanor of the witness . . . . -71 Because the defendant was able to
cross-examine at the preliminary hearing and because the witness
testified at the trial, the Court reasoned that the defendant was
provided all the protections of the clause. 76 While the majority made
no reference to a requirement of face-to-face confrontation, Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion fought for a more literal reading.
Although he agreed the defendant's rights were not violated, Harlan
stated, "Simply as a matter of English the clause may be read to
confer nothing more than a right to meet face-to-face all those who
'77
appear and give evidence at trial."
In Davis v. Alaska, 78 the Court emphasized the importance of
the confrontation right of cross-examination. In Davis, the principal
witness for the state was a juvenile who claimed to have seen the
defendant unload a safe from the trunk of a car. The defendant
attempted to show the witness, who had a criminal record, had accused
the defendant to avoid suspicion himself. Acting pursuant to state
law, the judge refused to allow the defendant to expose the witness'
juvenile record at trial. 79 The Supreme Court held this violated the
defendant's confrontation right of cross-examination. 80 In so holding,
the Court reasoned that cross-examination was the basic purpose
behind the confrontation clause. 8 Thus, the State's interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile's criminal record could not
73. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).

74.
75.
76.
77.

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring), quoted in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct.

2798, 2800 (1988).
78. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
79. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1974). The laws at issue in Davis
were ALASLK R. CHILDREN'S PROC., rule 23 and ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971).
80. Id. at 318.

81. See id. at 315-17.
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support such an infringement of the defendant's more consequential
right of cross-examination.8 2 Further, the Davis Court supported the
significance of the clause's cross-examination right. The Court quoted
Dean Wigmore's voluminous treatise, "[tihe opponent demands [sixth
amendment] confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon
the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination.' '83
Then, in 1980, the Court formulated a confrontation clause
analysis to test the constitutionality of the admission of hearsay
evidence. In Ohio v. Roberts,84 the state issued five subpoenas to their
key witness at her parents' home.85 Being unable to find her, the state
presented her transcribed preliminary hearing testimony as evidence
in the defendant's trial. The defendant objected to the admission of
the transcript because the state did nothing more to locate the witness
6
than re-issue subpoenas to the same address. The Supreme Court
replied, "in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-toface accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity." 87 The Court concluded that if a "good-faith," "reasonable"
the
effort by the state failed to secure the presence of the witness,
88
requisite necessity for admitting hearsay evidence was shown. Despite
89
its failure to follow leads to locate the witness the Court held the
prosecutor had made a "good-faith" effort to locate her.90 Thus, the
9
requisite necessity was demonstrated. ' In addition to the necessity
requirement, the Roberts court found the confrontation clause demanded that circumstances surrounding the making of the statement
or the contents of the statement itself must indicate that the assertion
82. Id. at 319.
83. Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at

123 (3d ed. 1940)). The Coy majority rejects this precise statement by Dean Wigmore.
Compare Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 n.2 (1988) with Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.
Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
85. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 59 (1980).
86. See id. at 59-60. The witness disappeared shortly after the preliminary
hearing. However, before trial, the witness contacted her mother twice by phone and
a social worker from San Francisco also called the mother regarding the witness'
welfare application.
87. Id. at 65 (no support is cited for "the Framers' preference for face-to-face
accusation").
88. See id. at 74.
89. See supra note 86.

90. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75-76 (1980).
91. Id.
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was reliable. 92 Here, the defendant had thoroughly cross-examined the
witness regarding the accusation at the preliminary hearing which
ensured the reliability of her testimony. 93
Recently, a plurality of the Court held that the confrontation
clause does not include a right to pre-trial discovery of a state agency's
confidential records of its investigation of child abuse cases. 94 In
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,95 the defendant was accused of sexually
assaulting his thirteen-year-old daughter.9 Before the defendant was
criminally charged, Pennsylvania's Children and Youth Services agency
had compiled an extensive amount of information from their own
investigation. 97 The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for an
order to compel discovery of the agency's file. 9 The Supreme Court,
in part, upheld the trial court's decision.9 A plurality of the Court
reasoned that the right to confrontation applied only during trial to
guarantee physical confrontationoo and the opportunity for crossexamination. 1°
0 Because the defendant was not precluded in any way
from thoroughly cross-examining each witness, the Court held the
defendant's right to confrontation had not been violated. 0 2 However,
a majority of the Court held the defendant's right to a fair trial 03
required the trial judge to examine the file and determine whether
any exculpatory evidence in the file would have changed the verdict. 104
92. Id. at 65-66. The Court concluded that the reliability of a statement will
be presumed when the hearsay exception under which it falls is "firmly rooted." Id.
at 66. Although the meaning and implications of the "firmly rooted" exception will
not be examined here, a detailed discussion can be found in Goldman, Not so "Firmly
Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1987).
93. Id. at 70-73.
94. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
95. Id.

96. See id. at 43.
97. See id.at 43-44, & n.2.
98. See id. at 44 (the defehdant's request was a general one for all the documents
within the file; the only document he specifically requested-a medical exam-was
apparently not in the file).
99. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1987). Two dissenters and one
concurring justice asserted that the denial of discovery denies effective cross-examination, and thus violates the defendant's right to confrontation. See id. at 61-62
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 51.

101. See id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per
curiam)).
102. See id. at 54.

103. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (due process clause).
104. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57-58 (1987).
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Just four months after Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court held
that a criminal defendant could be excluded from a competency
hearing conducted after the jury was sworn, but before any testimony
had been given.' 05 In Kentucky v. Stincer,"°6 the defendant was accused
of sodomizing three young children.'°7 Just before the trial, the judge,
prosecutor, and defense counsel conducted an in-chambers hearing to
determine the competency of two of the children to testify.'0 Despite
his objections, the defendant was excluded from the hearing.' l 9 On
appeal, the Supreme Court did not squarely address the face-to-face
confrontation issue." 0 Instead, the Court held the confrontation clause
was not violated by excluding the defendant from the competency
hearing "[b]ecause [the defendant] had the opportunity for full and
effective cross-examination of the two witnesses during trial . . .,,
The Court reasoned that the "functional purpose" of the clause was
to preserve for criminal defendants "an opportunity for cross-examination.1" 2 Thus, because the defendant could have cross-examined
the girls with the same questions at trial which were asked at the
hearing, his right to confrontation had not been abridged." 3
The history of the confrontation clause is inconclusive as to
whether an adverse witness must be able to see the defendant. The
historical development of the right of cross-examination and the rule
against hearsay sheds little light upon whether a face-to-face meeting
was contemplated when the confrontation clause was drafted. In
addition, the issue of whether the confrontation clause requires a
face-to-face meeting between adverse witnesses and a criminal defendant at trial has never been squarely decided by the Supreme Court.
Mattox, Green, Davis, and Roberts illustrate the Supreme Court's
earlier views of confrontation.
105. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
106. Id. at 732.
107. Id. at 732-33.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. It seems unusual that after briefly acknowledging the right to face-to-face
confrontation in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), just four months
before, the Court would completely disregard the issue here. Although the Court
refused to distinguish between a pre-trial proceeding and a trial, Stincer's confrontation clause issues may have been more easily dismissed with logic similar to that in
Ritchie-namely, that the competency hearing was a pre-trial proceeding and the
right to face-to-face confrontation does not attach until trial.
111. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987).
112. Id. at 736.
113. Id. at 740.
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In Mattox v. United States," 4 the Court described literal confrontation as the jury's "face-to-face" observation of the witness'
demeanor while testifying." 5 The Court in Californiav. Green'16 added
that the confrontation clause required sworn and cross-examined
testimony to ensure the sincerity and accuracy of the witness' statements." 7 Four years later, the Court described cross-examination as
the fundamental guarantee of the clause in Davis v. Alaska."' Finally,
in Ohio v. Roberts,"9 the Court announced that before confrontation
is abridged by admitting hearsay evidence, the confrontation clause
requires the state show a justifiable need for introducing a statement
without producing the declarant and some indication of the statement's reliability. 12 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie'2' and Kentucky v. Stincer'2
suggest the Court recognized a right to face-to-face confrontation,
but thought cross-examination to be more consequential. None of the
opinions in the above cases attaches any special significance to a
witness' ability to view the defendant. 23 In fact, the requirements
specified in each case can be met without such face-to-face confrontation. For instance, the translucent screen used in Coy, satisfied each
requirement of the prior cases.
III.

COY V. IOWA

Two thirteen-year-old girls were sexually assaulted one evening
while camping in back of one of their homes.' 24 The attacker wore a
nylon stocking over his face and shined a flashlight in the girls' eyes
such that they were unable to identify him.' 25 Nevertheless, John Coy
114. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
115. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1985); see also supra
text accompanying notes 65-72.
116. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
117. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1976); see also supra text

accompanying notes 73-77.
118. 415 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1974). See also supra text accompanying notes 7883.
119. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
120. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
121. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
122. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
123. Although not at issue in Davis, the Court in dictum apparently rejected
any significance in a face-to-face meeting. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 31516 (1974); see also supra text accompanying note 83.
124. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986).
125. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988). The fact that the girls could

1989:109]

COY V. IOWA-CONFRONTATION

REQUIREMENTS

soon became the principal suspect.' 26 Before trial, the state moved,
pursuant to 1985 Iowa Acts 338.80, to have a translucent screen
placed between the defendant and the two girls while they testified. ,1227
The trial court granted the motion over Coy's numerous objections.
At trial, the screen was placed in front of Coy, but in such a way
that the judge, jury, and attorneys were able to see the young witnesses
while they testified. 129 Also, the lighting in the courtroom was adjusted
to allow the defendant to faintly see the girls through the screen.'

30

Although they were unable to see the defendant, each girl was told
the defendant could see and hear her.' 3 ' In the end, Coy "was32
convicted of two counts of engaging in lascivious acts with a child.'
He appealed the use of the screen to the Iowa Supreme Court on the
grounds that because the girls were unable to see him, his right to
confrontation was denied. 133

not identify the perpetrator is not mentioned in the Iowa Supreme Court's decision.
State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986). However Justice Blackmun and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the dissenters in Coy, believed the inability to identify the attacker
was an important issue. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2806 n.1 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). They note that neither the state nor the defense requested the girls to
identify the defendant. Id. Because Coy did not raise the issue of identification, the
right of cross-examination was not implicated. Thus, there was no violation of
confrontation clause protections. See id.
126. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986).
127. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988). The statute has been
codified as IowA CODE § 910A.14 (1987) and reads in part:
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind
a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during
the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party.
However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take measures to insure
that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform
the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989).
128. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
129. See id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This fact is not mentioned in
the majority opinion. Indeed, the fact that the judge, jury, and attorneys could see
the witnesses is of no consequence to the result reached by the majority because the
confrontation clause requires the witnesses be able to see the defendant. See id. at
2802; see also supra note 125.
130. See id. at 2799. The Iowa Supreme Court stated that the fact that Coy
could see the witnesses was "not constitutionally significant" because the primary
purpose of the clause is to ensure the defendant's right of cross-examination. State
v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Iowa 1986).
131. See Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 734.
132. Id. at 730.
133. See id. at 730-31.
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The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the use of the screen. 3 4 Relying

on Davis v. Alaska,'35 the Iowa court held that face-to-face confrontation was not required by the confrontation clause. 36 The court
further concluded that each protection afforded under the confrontation right had been provided at Coy's trial. First, Coy fully crossexamined the two girls. 3 7 Second, both the judge and jury were able
to scrutinize the behavior of the girls during their testimony. 3 ' Third,

the girls were sworn to tell the truth, signifying to them the seriousness
and importance of truthful testimony. 3 9 Additionally, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Coy's argument that the trial judge should have
at least found the screen necessary to avoid traumatizing the young

witnesses before instituting the screen."4 The court, relying on Ohio

v. Roberts,4' reasoned that proof of necessity was required only for
introducing certain out-of-court statements into evidence. The rule
served no purpose when a witness testified at trial and was available
42
for cross-examination. 1
Because the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the state statute over
Coy's constitutional attack, the United States Supreme Court heard
the case on appeal. 43 The Supreme Court reversed the Iowa court's
decision. Relying on several unique authorities,'" the Court held the
Iowa statute unconstitutional because it violated the defendant's
explicit constitutional right of face-to-face confrontation. "41

134. See id. at 734.
135. 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1395 at 123

(3d ed. 1940) ("The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of
gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination ....

)).

136. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986).
137. See id.
138. See id.

139. See id.

140. See id.
141. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

142. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (Supreme Court will hear a case on appeal
when the decision of the state's highest court upholds a state statute against a
constitutional challenge).
144. Justice Scalia cites the Christian Bible (Acts 25:16), Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.
Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988); William Shakespeare (Richard II, act 1, sc. 1); President
Eisenhower (Remarks at the Meeting of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League
(Nov. 23, 1953), quoted in Pollitt, supra note 19, at 2801; as well as the age old
saying, "[look me in the eye and say that."
145. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988).
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THE COURT'S OPINION

In Coy v. Iowa,'4 six members of the Supreme Court decided
that the sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant that an
adverse witness will be able to look at him while that witness testifies.1 47 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and White
joined the opinion written by Justice Scalia. However, O'Connor
authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice White joined, to
express her view that the important right acknowledged by the Court
is open to exceptions. 48 Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, firmly dissented.

49

After reviewing the facts, the Court immediately suggests there
right.
is no precise, conventional support for a physical confrontation
5 ° "comes
amendment'
The majority states the language of the sixth
5 1 Then, to define this age old right to
to us on faded parchment."'
confrontation, Justice Scalia turns to the Roman law as depicted in
the Christian Bible. "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver
any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face-toface, and 5 2has been given a chance to defend himself against the
charges. ''
Because they lacked conclusive historical and precedential support
for their decision, the majority had to address why this fundamental
right to a face-to-face accusation had never before been explicitly held
to exist.' Essentially, the Court explained that the face-to-face meet146. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
147. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-01 (1988) (the use of a translucent
screen blocking only the witness' view of the defendant violates the confrontation
clause even though the defendant can see the witness).
148. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2805. Newly appointed Justice Kennedy took no part in this decision.
See id. at 2799.
150. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
151. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174
(1970)) (Harlan, J., concurring). In reference to this particular quote of Justice
Harlan, one commentator writes, "Harlan's own search for historical explication of
the clause yielded no convincing evidence of its intended meaning." Lilly, supra note
8 at 208.
152. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2800 (quoting Acts 25:16 (Governor Festus at the trial
of Paul)).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 65-123 (discussion of major confrontation clause cases). The dissent agrees that the right exists. Justice Blackmun states,
"I agree with the concurrence that '[tihere is nothing novel' in the proposition that
the Confrontation Clause 'reflects a preference' for the witness to be able to see the
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ing requirement had simply been assumed to exist. The Court rejected
the state's assertion that the vast amounts of litigation on the confrontation issues of admitting hearsay evidence and limiting crossexamination indicate that cross-examination is the core right guaranteed by the confrontation clause.' 5 4 Instead, the Court suggested that
the reason for extensive litigation in these areas is not because crossexamination is the fundamental confrontation clause protection, but
rather vast litigation arises because of uncertainty as to the scope of
the sixth amendment's protection in these areas.' 55 On the other hand,
no clarification has been necessary regarding face-to-face confrontation because it is obviously included within the confrontation rights. 5 6
To strengthen the argument that a face-to-face meeting requirement within the confrontation clause has been presupposed, Justice
Scalia examined the literal meaning of confrontation. First, he cited
Justice Harlan's belief that, by definition, "confrontation" demands
an eye to eye encounter. 5 7 Then, the opinion consulted the Latin
roots of "confrontation" to illustrate that Harlan's image is an
element within the word itself.' The root "con-" comes from a
Latin word meaning "opposed," and the Latin root of "-front"
means "forehead."' '59 To symbolize the accuracy of these internal
elements, Justice Scalia cited Shakespeare's Richard II where the king
demands his enemies accuse him "face-to-face, and frowning brow
to brow . . ."60 In addition to defining confrontation, Justice Scalia
intended this illustration link the literal definition to human nature
defendant." Rather, the dissent argues that it is not as deep rooted and essential as
the majority implies. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2806 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
154. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
155. See id. But see Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (The cases
challenging the admission of hearsay and limitations of cross-examination "reflect
the Confrontation Clause's functional purpose in ensuring a defendant an opportunity
for cross-examination.").
156. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2800.
157. See id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
158. See id.
159. Id.

160. Id. (quoting Shakespeare, Richard II, act 1, sc. 1.) See also 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 5, § 1395, at 153 n.2 ("In the earlier and more emotional periods, this
confrontation was supposed (more often than it now is) to be able to unstring the
nerves of a false witness .... The great dramatist [Shakespeare] alludes to this
earlier conception, still current in his day . . ...
") Dean Wigmore then quotes the

same scene in Richard II.
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and the timelessness of the feeling of justice in accusing one to his
16
face. ,
162 although
Next the opinion noted more conventional case law,
the few cases mentioning the face-to-face requirement did so only in
passing. 163 Yet, the majority did not claim the brief references to face161. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 n.2 (1988).
162. The cases involving the confrontation clause cited by the majority in Coy
include: Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (admission of co-conspirator's
hearsay statements did not violate the confrontation clause when statements were
made in furtherance of the conspiracy); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)
(barring defendant from in-chambers competency hearing did not violate defendant's
right to confront because defendant was able to cross-examine the witness at trial on
the same matters at issue in the hearing); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)
(defendant's right to confrontation does not include a right to unlimited pre-trial
discovery); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (defendant's right to confrontation
violated by admission of co-defendant's confession against her); Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Supreme Court held that trial court's refusal to permit
defendant to cross-examine prosecution's witness for bias resulting from state's
dismissal of charge of public drunkenness violated defendant's right to confrontation);
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (defendant was not denied confrontation
when State's expert witness was unable to recall which of three tests he had used to
reach his conclusion, even though it hindered defendant's efforts to discredit him);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (Supreme Court held that confrontation clause
was not violated by admitting transcribed preliminary hearing testimony of State's
key witness when statements were reliable and witness was unavailable); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (state's interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile
offenders fell to defendant's right to cross-examine the juvenile witness about the
witness' prior record); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (strict application
of the rules against hearsay and the rules of evidence which precluded defendant's
attempts to elicit exculpatory evidence violated defendant's right to confrontation);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (defendant's right to confrontation was not
denied when trial court admitted the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator made
during the conspiracy because the statement was reliable); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970) (admitting witness' prior inconsistent statement as evidence at trial
did not violate defendant's right to confront); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(the sixth amendment's right to confrontation is binding upon the states); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (defendant's right to confront violated when State
introduced convictions of thieves to conclusively prove that the property received by
defendant was stolen); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (introduction of
transcribed testimony from first trial into evidence at defendant's second trial for the
same offense did not violate confrontation).
163. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-01 (1988). No case cited by the Court
stands for requiring a face-to-face encounter, and the majority does not claim any
do. But see id. at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 157 (1970), is the best authority for the majority's interpretation because prior
cases were interpreted to support the "literal right to 'confront'. . . ." However, a
quotation from Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895), within the
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to-face confrontation demanded adherence to such practice. 16 Rather,
these passing remarks recognized the existence and practice of testifying face-to-face with the criminal defendant. 165 Thus, a right to
physical confrontation has always been assumed. 66
The Court then explained the use of unconventional authorities
to illustrate the long-held belief that a fundamental element of fair
accusation is making that accusation to the person's face. 167 The
majority augmented this historical reference with a more current
portrayal from yet another unconventional authority-President Eisenhower. 161 In a speech before the Anti-Defamation League, the
President vigorously proclaimed that the community "code" of his
small home town did not tolerate talking about people behind their

back. 169 The Court insisted that the well-known phrase, "[l]ook me
in the eye and say that,"' 170 as well as the other unconventional
illustrations, were employed to establish that something more than
just the law requires an accusation be made face-to-face with the

accused.171
After tracing the natural human preference for face-to-face ac-

cusation, the Court expounded upon the purposes served by such a

requirement. Likening the procedure to cross-examination, the majority found that testifying while able to look at the accused 72 furthered

same paragraph limits this literal confrontation to cross-examination.). See also supra
notes 7, 162.
164. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
165. See id.at 2801.
166. See id. at 2800 ("We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face to face meeting with witnesses.").
167. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 n.2 (1988).
168. See id. at 2801.
169. See id. Also cited in Pollitt, supra note 19, at 381 (quoting President
Eisenhower, Remarks at the Meeting of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League
(Nov. 23, 1953). According to President Eisenhower, in Abilene, Kansas it was
necessary to: "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You could not
sneak -upon him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffering the
penalty of an outraged citizenry ....

."

Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.

170. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
171. Although the authority used by the majority is unconventional, it seems
doubtful that "traditional" authority could have established the existence or nonexistence of any legal right to face-to-face confrontation. See supra text accompanying
notes 17-123 (discussion of the history of the confrontation clause). Indeed, this issue
has never squarely presented itself before the Court, perhaps because the witnessshielding procedures have only recently been enacted. See, e.g., supra note 10 (all
statutes enacted after 1985).

172. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988). Justice Scalia remarks,
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7 3 As a matter of
the truth-seeking goal of the sixth amendment.'
human experience, criticizing and accusing a person "to his face" is
74
difficult, even when the statement is true. The Court reasoned that
the untruthful witness will experience even greater difficulty than the
truthful witness accusing a defendant to his face.' The result then
would be that either the jury will infer from the witness' discomfort
that he is lying or the untruthful witness will be so unnerved by the
additional burden on his conscience that he will recant the testimony. 76 The Court noted that avoiding the unnerving effect of
looking 77at the defendant was precisely the state's purpose in using the
screen.1
Finally, after determining the existence and purposes of the
use of
defendant's right to face the witness, the Court held that the
178
this
In
the translucent screen in Coy's case was unconstitutional.
section of the opinion, the Court recognized that the confrontation
rights to cross-examination and to exclude hearsay are frequently
abridged. 179 However, the opinion distinguished these rights from the
right of face-to-face confrontation because they are only "implicit"
in the clause. 8 0 Therefore, denial of cross-examination and admission
of hearsay evidence are commonly permitted.' On the other hand,
physically facing the witness at trial is an "explicit" right because this

"The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes
upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw
its own conclusions." Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.

175. See id.

176. See id.
177. See id.

178. See id.

179. See id. at 2802-03.
180. Id. at 2802-03. But see Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) ("The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to securefor the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.")(emphasis
in original) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940)).
181. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988). The Federal Rules of Evidence
codified many of the exceptions to hearsay in Rules 803 and 804. Under rule 803,
hearsay falling within one of its exceptions can be used as evidence without regard

to whether the declarant is available to testify himself. These exceptions include

statements such as present sense impressions, excited utterances, recorded recollec-

tions, and business records. FED. R. Evm. 803. To be admissible under Rule 804,
the statement must not only fall within the codified exception, but the declarant must
also be unavailable. Former testimony, dying declarations, and statements against
interest fall within this exception. FED. R. Evm. 804.
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'
is "the irreducible literal meaning of the clause. 'i82
Although the
majority refused to expound on possible exceptions, they suggested
that if exceptions to the face-to-face requirement exist, the confrontation clause would at the very least demand a fact-specific finding
of countervailing public policy which necessitated abridgement."3
Consequently, the Court held the use of the screen unconstitutional
because it violated the defendant's explicit right to physical, face-to4
face confrontation.1
The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
error was constitutionally harmless without reaching Coy's due process
claim' 85 with instructions to the lower court to determine whether
use
of the screen was harmless error in light of the other evidence.86
The
Court specifically forbade speculation on whether the absence of
the
screen would have lessened the veracity of the children's testimony.
Instead, the majority instructed the Iowa Supreme Court to evaluate

182. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
175
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
183. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The Court states that "something more
than
the type of generalized finding [such as Iowa's presumption of necessity]
underlying
such a statute is needed when the exception is not 'firmly ...

rooted in our

jurisprudence."' Id.
A careful reading of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), would seem to
indicate
that in order for an exception to be considered "firmly rooted," there
must be a
demonstration of necessity. See id. at 65-66. A "firmly rooted" exception
to the rule
against hearsay presumes the statement is reliable, not necessary. See id.
at 65-66;
see also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2809 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
For
further information on the meaning of "firmly rooted" see Goldman, Not
so "Firmly
Rooted" Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. Rv. 1 (1987).
184. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
185. See id. Coy claimed that the screen prejudiced the jury by making
him
appear guilty in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The due process clause
guarantees
that "guilt or innocence [is] determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced
at
trial, and not on grounds of ...

circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). For example, the State
cannot bring
the defendant to court in chains and surrounded by armed guards because
the jury
is likely to infer from his treatment that he is guilty. A trial procedure which
brands
the defendant as guilty is unconstitutional unless the State can prove the
procedure
promotes "an essential state interest." Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,
569 (1986).
186. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988); see also Chapman
v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (to be deemed harmless error, an infringement
of
a defendant's constitutional rights must be "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt");
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (the harmless error analysis
applies to
infringements on the confrontation clause).
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the strength of the state's case without the testimony of the two
187
girls.
Justices O'Connor and White filed a concurring opinion to soften
8 8
O'Connor, author
the prohibitive language of the majority opinion.
that could
inference
any
rejected
of the concurring opinion, expressly
the
indicate
be drawn from the majority's language which would
criminal defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation was abso9°
lute. 18 9 O'Connor distinguished Iowa's translucent screen' from videotaping and closed-circuit television procedures used to protect child
1 91
She indicated many statutes in other
witnesses in most other states.
because the witness testifies "in
challenge
states would survive a Coy
' 92
Thus, the confrontation clause is
the presence of the defendant.'
193
not implicated.
For those states permitting a court to shield the defendant from
the child's view during videotaping or broadcasting, the concurring
Justices would require the trial court to make a fact-specific finding
1 94
The concurrence
that shielding is necessary to protect the child.
have always
hearsay
against
rule
the
to
argued that the exceptions
reconfrontation
face-to-face
been admissible as exceptions to the
9
v.
Ohio
in
Consequently, the necessity test established
quirement.
6s
Roberts' would logically apply to infringement of face-to-face con97
frontation during live testimony. 1 According to O'Connor, protecting
child witnesses from the trauma associated with in-court testimony is
187. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803. On remand, the Supreme Court of Iowa
reversed Coy's conviction. See State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714 (Iowa 1988).
188. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 2804.
190. Iowa appeared to be the only state which provided for the use of a screening
device within the courtroom. See id.
191. See id.
192. Id. (whether O'Connor equates testimony "inthe presence of the defendant" with testifying "while able to look at the defendant," is unclear from her
concurring opinion).
193. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2804 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
But see infra text accompanying notes 257-64 (O'Connor cites to CAL. PENAL CODE
The
ANN. § 1347 (West Supp. 1989) which permits two-way, closed-circuit television.
broadcasting
the
in
allowed
not
is
but
monitor
defendant appears on the child's
room. The confrontation clause may still be implicated in this situation.).
194. See id.at 2805.
195. See id. at 2804-05 ("[V]irtually all of our cases approving the use of hearsay
evidence have implicated the literal right to 'confront' . . . and yet have fallen within
an exception to the general requirement of face-to-face confrontation.").
196. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
197. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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an important state interest.19 Thus, the potential harm to a child
witness from testifying in court is a proper basis upon which to
establish the required necessity. 99

The dissenting Justices, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, did not dispute the existence of a constitutional "preference" for face-to-face confrontation.200 Rather, they disagreed with

the significance the majority attributed to face-to-face confronta201
tion.

According to the dissent, history and authoritative precedent

indicate the most essential confrontation right is cross-examination. 202
Consequently, the strong state interest in protecting children from
emotional trauma and ensuring their effective testimony far outweighed the defendant's right to face the child at trial. 2 3
B.

INTERPRETATION OF COY

The Coy majority placed great significance on the right to faceto-face confrontation, refusing to recognize sworn testimony, crossexamination, and the jury's observance of the witness as substitutes. 0 4
However, after declaring face-to-face confrontation the only explicitly

guaranteed confrontation right, the majority stated, "We leave for
another day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist.
Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when
necessary to further an important public policy.''205 While this state198. See id.; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (state's
interest in providing abused children with an agency, whose records are confidential,
is sufficiently compelling to prevent discovery of those records; thus, a trial judge
may review records in camera and inform defense counsel of material information).
199. See id.
200. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2804

(O'Connor, J., concurring)).

201. Id.
202. See id. at 2806-07. While the majority relied on "literature, anecdote, and

dicta ...." id. at 2806, the dissent preferred Dean Wigmore. "There never was at

common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as
distinguishedfrom cross-examination." Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1397, at 158) (emphasis in original). The dissent also
found persuasive the lack of references to face-to-face confrontation in prior opinions
resolving hearsay evidence. They asserted "the Court did not consider even worthy
of mention the fact that the declarant could not see the defendant at the time he
made his accusatory statement." Id. (discussing Dulton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
203. See id. at 2809; supra note 9. The dissent also briefly addressed the
defendant's due process claim. They found that the use of the screen was not
inherently prejudicial and did not necessarily appear to the jury to be a label of guilt.
See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2810 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. See id.
205. Id. at 2803.
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ment implies that there may be no exceptions to the explicit confrontation right, it sets out a test for possible exceptions at the same time.
Thus, the language and substance of the Coy opinion can advance at
least two interpretations. 206 It may be read broadly, yielding an
interpretation which regards the face-to-face requirement as so vital
that it may never be infringed. Under such an interpretation, almost
all statutes permitting a child's view of the defendant to be obstructed
while testifying would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, Coy
may be read narrowly, to require showing of necessity, grounded in
public policy, before avoiding face-to-face confrontation. A narrow
interpretation would permit most current statutory procedures shielding child witnesses, but, if applied as written, some statutes would
still be unconstitutional.
1.

The Broad Interpretation

A broad interpretation of the Coy opinion would focus on the
significance the Court placed on face-to-face confrontation. As noted
earlier, a unique discussion of the importance of face-to-face accusation dominates the opinion. 20 7 Justice Scalia, author of the opinion,
indicated that the right of face-to-face confrontation may be more
significant than the cross-examination right. Comparing the two, he
noted that the clause explicitly guarantees face-to-face confrontation,
while the cross-examination right is only implicitly guaranteed. Thus,
20 8
cross-examination could occasionally be infringed. The great significance Coy confers upon literal confrontation could logically be
interpreted as an absolute ban on all testimony not given with the
opportunity of viewing the defendant. 209 Under such an interpretation,
all state statutes permitting a court to obstruct a child witness' view
of the criminal defendant would violate the confrontation clause.
Even detailed statutes which attempt to protect face-to-face confrontation would not survive this construction. 210 For example, in Califor206. But see infra note 223.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 157-171.
208. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2798, 2802 (1988).
209. This interpretation is not as absurd as it may first appear. In fact, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion attempted to dispel any such interpretation. See id.
at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989). The first paragraph of the
statute evidences California legislature's intent to preserve the right of face-to-face
confrontation:
It is the intent of the Legislature . . .to provide the court with discretion

to employ unusual court procedures to protect the rights of a child witness,
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nia, a trial court faced with extraordinary facts may permit a victim
under ten years of age to testify from another room via two-way,
closed-circuit television. 21 ' The procedure is only permitted if the child
is found unable to testify in person because certain statutorily listed

circumstances surrounding the crime have had a "substantial" disturbing effect on the child.2 12 Although the defendant is not allowed

in the room from which the child's image is broadcast, California
explicitly requires that the defendant appear on the child's monitor.2 3

An absolute reading of Coy would strike down this statute despite its
zealous protection of literal face-to-face confrontation.
Even though California requires the defendant's image be trans-

mitted live to the child, this is unlikely to satisfy the literal confrontation Justice Scalia contemplated. 2 14 The significance of literal
confrontation was in the fact that the physical meeting weighed on
the conscience of the witness, increasing the likelihood of sincere
testimony. 215 The mere fact that the California legislature believed a
child would be less traumatized by viewing the defendant over a
television screen evidences the circumvention of the purpose of the

face-to-face meeting. 216

Neither could California successfully justify the abridging of face-

to-face confrontation by asserting its interest in protecting the children. 2 7 This same argument failed in Coy.21 s Although the Iowa
the rights of the defendant, and the integrity of the judicial process. In
exercising its discretion, the court necessarily will be required to balance the
rights of the defendant against the need to protect a child witness and to
preserve the integrity of the court's truthfinding function. This discretion is
intended to be used selectively when the facts and circumstances in the
individual case present compelling evidence of the need to use these unusual
procedures.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(a) (West Supp. 1989).
211. See id.
212. See id. at § 1347(b)(2) (the list of potentially traumatic circumstances
includes threats of serious injury to the child or a family member, use of a "deadly

weapon" or infliction of serious injury upon the child).
213. See id. at § 1347(h).
214. But see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2804 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (testifying by* two-way, closed-circuit television "raise[s] no substantial
Confrontation Clause problems").
215. See id. at 2802.
216. See id. ("The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness
of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very
phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential "trauma" that allegedly justified
the extraordinary procedure . . ").
217. Because children are less emotionally mature than adults, they are treated
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statute at issue in Coy created a presumption of need to shield
children,2 19 a broad, strict interpretation of Coy would not distinguish
Iowa's presumption from California's requirement of a factuallybased finding of necessity. The importance of face-to-face confrontation would outweigh California's interest in protecting young witnesses just as it did in Coy.
The failure of California's statute illustrates the difficulty states
will have in shielding child witnesses under a broad interpretation.
However, even under a broad interpretation, a unique type of necessity
might prove to outweigh the importance of the face-to-face meeting
and uphold shielding procedures. For instance, a Utah child witness
statute permits a court to block a child's view of the defendant while
a child's testimony is broadcast live into the courtroom when "the
child's testimony will be inherently unreliable if he is required to
testify in the defendant's presence. ' 220 In Coy, the Court was especially concerned that a witness not facing the person "whom he will
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts" could more easily
fabricate testimony. 22' The situation contemplated by the Utah legislature is exactly the opposite. Here, the truth would be confused and
distorted because of the defendant's presence. Thus, abridging the
right to face-to-face confrontation in such a situation would "ensure
the integrity of the fact-finding process ' 222 and actually increase the
reliability of the testimony. Should the court find the child's testimony
would be more reliable when the defendant is hidden, abridging faceto-face confrontation should be sufficiently justified to withstand a
confrontation clause attack under a broad interpretation of Coy.
An absolute ban on infringement of face-to-face confrontation is
unlikely because, as the concurring and dissenting opinions observed,
a broad reading would be inconsistent with the admission of hearsay
evidence. 223 Taking the broad interpretation to its logical conclusion,
differently under the law. The juvenile justice system, age limits on alcohol consumption, and child neglect statutes evidence the validity of the State's high interest
in protecting children. See Labai, supra note 9, at 979-80.
218. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988) ("It is a truism that
constitutional protections have costs.").
219. See id. The emotional stress of testifying under normal trial conditions may
cause the child's testimony to be unreliable. See Note, Parent - Child Incest: Proof
at Trial Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131
(1981).

220. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989).
221. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988).
222. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987).
223. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2807-08
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hearsay evidence could no longer be admitted because the exceptions
to the rule against hearsay allow the admission of hearsay evidence
regardless of whether the declarant made the statement while facing
the defendant. 224 However, Scalia implied only the "implicit" right
of cross-examination is implicated when hearsay is admitted. 225 Yet
the characterization ignores the practical implications of Coy's faceto-face requirement.
The majority opinion also ignored the fact that hearsay is less
reliable than live testimony. 226 When hearsay evidence is admitted, the
statement is not made while the declarant is under the conscienceburdening oath, 227 while the testimony of the shielded child witness
is. The declarant's possible biases or inaccurate memory are not
checked by cross-examination, 221 whereas the shielded child witness'
are. His comfort and confidence in making the accusation are not
observed by a scrutinizing judge and jury, 229 whereas the child witness'
are. In fact, the only tests for reliability of the hearsay evidence are
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. 230 On the
other hand, when the declarant gives his statement in court, he is
subject to the oath, cross-examination, and the observant eyes of the
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although logically inconsistent, in the future the Court
could distinguish the right to face-to-face confrontation from what they describe as
"the right to exclude out-of-court statements .

. . ."

Id. at 2802. Thereby, the Court

may "eliminate" the need to extinguish centuries of legal precedent developing
hearsay exceptions.
224. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(1) ("A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter."); 803(2) ("A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement caused by the
event or condition."); 804(B)(2) ("In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be his impending death."). None of the foregoing exceptions, which allow
hearsay to be admitted, requires the criminal defendant's presence when the statement
is made.
225. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2805 (1988).
226. That live testimony is inherently more reliable than hearsay is precisely the
reason for the rule against hearsay. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298
(1973); see also supra note 6.
227. See supra note 6; text accompanying note 75.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(l),(2) advisory committee's note (it is presumed
that when a person describes an event while it happens or in a state of excitement
after an event, that person has no time to think of a lie).
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judge and jury, despite whether the witness can see the defendant. '
The checks on a statement's reliability available in the courtroom are
clearly more thorough and accurate than the generalized assumptions
surrounding the circumstantial checks on reliability which permit the
use of hearsay evidence.232 Thus, it would seem illogical to preclude
in-court testimony given without face-to-face confrontation while
permitting out-of-court statements made without face-to-face confrontation.233

2.

The Narrow Interpretation

While a broad interpretation would constitutionally prohibit almost every procedure which prevents a witness from viewing the
defendant at trial, a narrow interpretation of Coy would permit
exceptions to the physical confrontation requirement when the state
demonstrates a need for such a procedure. Despite the significance
the majority ascribes to literal confrontation, the opinion suggests
infringement may be tolerated if "necessary to further an important
public policy.

' 23 4

Not only would a narrow reading avoid the harsh

results of the broad interpretation, but it would also eliminate the
of hearsay evidence and
logical discrepancies between the admission
235
the right to face-to-face confrontation.

231. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
232. See supra note 226.
233. While the face to face meeting requirement could be an additional confrontation clause requirement for the admission of hearsay, this too, is unlikely. While
some types of hearsay evidence are spoken by the declarant in front of the defendant,
see, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (transcript of preliminary hearing
testimony admitted at trial); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (transcript
of prior testimony given in front of defendant at his first trial is admitted at
defendant's second trial because witnesses died), long-established exceptions, such as
the excited utterance and dying declarations, would virtually be annihilated because
the defendant is rarely, if ever, present when the exclamation is made. See FED. R.
Evm. 803(2). It would be much more logical to permit exceptions to face-to-face
confrontation, than to destroy centuries of legal precedent developing hearsay exceptions. But see supra note 223 (distinguishing hearsay exceptions). If, as the majority
asserts, the face-to-face component has always been explicit in the confrontation
clause, there also must have been some exception to the requirement for the admission
of hearsay because it has continually been admitted since the adoption of the
Constitution. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2807-08
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (admission
of dying declaration does not violate confrontation clause).
234. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 223-33.
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To require the state to establish an actual need for the extraordinary procedure would be entirely consistent with the confrontation
analysis the Court developed for the admission of hearsay. In Ohio
v. Roberts,23 6 the Court established necessity as the threshold requirement for the admission of hearsay evidence.23 7 Because face-to-face
confrontation is abridged when hearsay evidence is admitted, 238 the
hearsay exceptions can also be characterized as exceptions to face-toface confrontation. 219 Consequently, the constitutional analysis for
both hearsay exceptions and face-to-face confrontation should involve
4

the threshold necessity finding. 2 0
In addition to establishing the necessity requirement, Ohio v.

Roberts24I also held sufficient necessity to constitutionally admit hearsay evidence was demonstrated if the declarant was physically unavailable to testify. 242 If unavailability were limited to physical

236. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
237. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
239. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2804-05 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240. See id. at 2803, 2805.
241. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
242. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74-75. State statutes shielding child
witnesses require varying degrees of potential harm to the child be shown before
procedures are implemented. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989)
(videotape of child's testimony may be used at trial if "further testimony would
cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim is medically unavailable .... );
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53, 92.54 (West Supp. 1989) (Court may employ videotaping
or closed-circuit television procedures if "there is a substantial likelihood that ...
[the witness would] suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm .... "); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1989) (Court may employ closedcircuit television procedure if child will suffer "serious emotional distress ....");
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (Court may order a
child's testimony be given through two-way, closed-circuit television if testifying in
court will result in "severe mental or emotional harm" to the child.); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-15.5(2),(3) (Supp. 1989) (a showing of "good cause" permits use of
closed-circuit television or videotaping).
The degree of unavailability required by the confrontation clause has yet to be
conclusively determined. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (sufficient
necessity shown if State makes "good faith effort to obtain [witness'] presence at
trial") (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)); Lilly, supra note 8, at
226-30 (In the context of "unavailability," questions arise surrounding "the extent
of the government's duty when no procedural mechanism exists for requiring the
declarant's presence, the range of acceptable 'excuses' for non-production, and the
extent to which the obligation to produce is affected by the significance of the
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unavailability, the mere presence of the child witness would pose a
significant problem to showing necessity for implementing child protection statutes. However, the Federal Rules of Evidence (promulgated
by the Supreme Court) already provide for psychological unavailability in the case of admitting hearsay. 243 Thus, because the quality and
reliability of statements made in court are better protected than those
made outside the courtroom, 2" psychological unavailability should at
least partially satisfy a necessity requirement for obstructing a witness'
view of a defendant.
Yet even a narrow interpretation cannot fully escape the significance the majority in Coy attributed to face-to-face confrontation.
The test suggested by Justice Scalia would require more than mere
necessity to infringe face-to-face confrontation. The procedure must
also "further an important public policy. 2 45 This additional requirement should not pose a problem in the context of shielding vulnerable
children. The Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie described the state's
2
interest in preventing and detecting child abuse as "compelling." "
In addition, both the concurrence and dissent in Coy indicated the
247
state had a very high interest in the mental health of its youth.
If the narrow interpretation prevails, many statutes allowing
defendants to be removed from a child's view during the child's
evidence in question and/or its probable reliability."). But compare Graham, The
Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The
State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 558-59 (1988) (without citing
authoritative support, the author believes the confrontation clause requires "a
showing of a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm ...."), with

Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981) (Basing its decision on
the Roberts requirements, this court proposed a balancing test of several factors to
determine whether the psychological condition of the witness rendered her unavailable
for admission of her preliminary hearing testimony. The court weighed the probability
of harm, the severity of the likely psychological harm, the length of time the injury
will last, and the difference between the trauma which could normally be expected
and that expected of this witness.). However, the degree of unavailability required to
circumscribe face-to-face confrontation may be higher than for denying cross-examination through admitting hearsay evidence because of the heightened importance of
Coy's literal confrontation.
243. See FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(4) (declarant may be deemed "unavailable" if he
"is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity ....").

244. See supra text accompanying notes 226-32.
245. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
246. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
247. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2808 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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testimony will withstand a constitutional challenge. However, if ap-

plied as 'they are written, statutes which permit a court to block a
child's view without a finding of necessity will still violate a criminal
defendant's confrontation rights. As the Court remarked in Coy,
"[s]ince there have been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not

be sustained by any conceivable exception." 248 The impact of a narrow
interpretation of Coy on various statutes shielding child witnesses is
best demonstrated by examining specific provisions and where they
succeed and fail to conform to its necessity requirement.
One common statutory provision for protecting child witnesses
from the trauma of conventional courtroom testimony provides for
videotaping the child's testimony before trial. 249 Then, in lieu of the

248. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
249. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989) (The court may permit the state to
videotape the deposition of a sexual offense victim who is under 16 years old upon
a showing of "good cause." The defendant must be present during the taping, and
the deposition is to be conducted as if the witness was testifying at trial. Unless the
tape "will unfairly prejudice the defendant .

.

. " it may be used at trial instead of

the witness' live testimony.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989) (The
preliminary hearing testimony of a victim of a sex crime who is under 16 may be
videotaped. The tape will be used at trial in lieu of live testimony upon a showing
"that further testimony would cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim
is medically unavailable .... ."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53, 92.54 (West Supp. 1989)
(In sexual abuse trials, Florida permits videotaping (§ 92.53) and closed-circuit
transmission of a child's testimony (§ 92.54) when "there is a substantial likelihood
that [a victim or witness who is under the age of 16 would] suffer at least moderate
emotional or mental harm if [he] were required to testify in open court .... "In
addition, the defendant may be removed from the view of the child during the
testimony.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986) (The court may order either
videotaping or two-way closed-circuit transmission of the testimony of a victim of
sexual abuse who is under 10 years old. However, the court must find the procedure
necessary. Sufficient necessity is established when either, in the opinion of a psychiatrist, in-court testimony would be traumatic or independent evidence shows "that it
is more likely than not that [in-court testimony] would be a traumatic experience for
the child." In these cases, the defendant should not be seen or heard by the child
while testifying, unless he is acting as his own attorney.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3515.5(2), (3) (Supp. 1989) (The Utah statute provides for both closed-circuit televised
testimony and videotaped testimony to be presented to the jury if the witness is under
14 and the victim of sexual abuse. The statute requires "good cause" for the use of
each. Also, the defendant will be permitted to physically face the young witness
unless it is found that "the child will suffer serious emotional or mental strain . ..
or . .. the child's testimony will be inherently unreliable if he is required to testify
in the defendant's presence." If the defendant is excluded from the child's view, the
child is to be informed that the defendant is listening.).
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child's live testimony, the recording is presented at trial. Typically,
these statutes also provide for hiding the defendant from the child
during taping.51 Before Coy, these procedures probably would have
had to meet only the Roberts necessity requirement for admitting
22
hearsay before the videotape could be presented as evidence. However, read narrowly, Coy has interjected the second necessity requirement. Before the defendant can be blocked from the child's view
during the taping, the state must demonstrate a risk of emotional
trauma to the child. Thus, videotaping procedures, such as those of
Connecticut, which mandate the defendant be outside the child's view
during taping, 25 3 are unconstitutional. In contrast, Vermont's proviwhen it finds
sion, which permits the court to hide the defendant 2only
5 4 should be conchild,
the
the defendant's presence will traumatize
stitutional because it asks for a factually-based finding of a need to
protect the child.
Closed-circuit television also has entered the courtroom to protect
child witnesses. 255 Here, the child's testimony is broadcast live into

250. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West Supp. 1989); FLA.
§ 38-1558 (1986); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN.
1989).
(Supp.
807
§
Evidence
of
STAT. ANN. Rules
251. See supra note 250.
252. See supra note 6.
253. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West Supp. 1989).
254. See VT. STAT. ANN. R. EviD. § 807 (Supp. 1989).
255. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989) (The testimony of a sexual offense victim
may be projected into the courtroom, to the jury, via closed-circuit television. During
the testimony, the defendant is allowed in the room with the witness.); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989) (California permits a victim of a sexual offense, who
is under 10 years old, to testify from another room via two-way, closed-circuit
to
television. This procedure can only be used if the child is found to be unable
had
have
crime
the
surrounding
testify in person because certain listed circumstances
a "substantial" effect on the child. The statute explicitly provides that the defendant
the
appear on the monitor in the witness' chamber and that the child may enter
Supp.
(West
54-86g
§
ANN.
STAT.
courtroom to identify the defendant.); CONN. GEN.
closed1989) (The court may order that a sexual abuse victim, under 13, testify via
testimony.
live
of
lieu
in
used
be
videotape
made
previously
a
circuit television or that
is to
Although the defendant will be allowed to see and hear the child, the court
Supp.
(West
92.54
§
ANN.
STAT.
remove the defendant from the child's view.); FLA.
(West
1989) (for specific provisions see supra note 249); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8
(West
14
910A.
§
ANN.
CODE
IowA
249);
note
supra
see
1986) (for specific provisions
television.
closed-circuit
via
testify
may
abuse
sexual
of
victim
(Child
Supp. 1989)
to
While the defendant is allowed to hear and see the child, he may be restricted
witness
the
However,
mirror."
or
view from "an adjacent room or behind a screen
PROC.
is to be told that the defendant is watching and listening.); MD. CTS. & JUD.
child
a
of
testimony
the
order
may
court
(The
1989)
(Supp.
CODE ANN. § 9-102
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the courtroom. This testimony is not subject to the Roberts necessity
requirement for admission because it is not hearsay.256 However,
statutory procedures which confine the defendant to the courtroom

must comply with the Coy mandate of substantiated necessity.
As one would expect, one-way, closed-circuit television will
obstruct the face-to-face confrontation between the defendant
and the
child witness when the defendant is confined to viewing from
the

courtroom monitor. Statutes, like those involved in Coy, which require
no finding that blocking the defendant out of the child's sight
is

necessary, are clearly unconstitutional if applied as they are written. 257
Maryland's statute, for example, would be unconstitutional
under a
narrow interpretation of Coy because it requires the defendant
to
remain in the courtroom during the broadcast.2s As with
similar
provisions for videotaping, those statutes which provide for
a finding
of necessity should meet the Coy standard. For instance,
Florida
permits the court to limit the defendant's view of the child
to the
courtroom monitor, but also requires the trial judge to "make
specific
findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling ....
259
Assuming the Florida courts base their rulings on the need to
protect
the child from emotional harm, or other important public policy,
the
statute should be constitutional.
victim of abuse to be transmitted into the courtroom via closed-circuit
television only
if the court finds courtroom testimony "will result in the child
suffering serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate."
The defendant, if represented by counsel, is not to be in the same room as the
child, but may
view the child from the courtroom.); N.Y. CuM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30
(McKinney
Supp. 1989) (in order to use closed-circuit television, the court must
find "by clear
and convincing evidence that it is likely, as a result of extraordinary
circumstances,
that such child witness will suffer severe mental or emotional harm
if required to
testify [in court]." Id. at § 65.10(1). The extraordinary circumstances
justifying such
a holding are listed in § 65.20(9) and include any aggravating circumstances
surrounding the offense (such as threats, use of weapons, or physical injury
to the child) as
well as the age of the child and the relationship between the child and
defendant. Id.
at § 65.20(9). Section 65.20(12) requires that the court explicitly find
that a physical
face-to-face encounter between the defendant and the witness "will
contribute
likelihood that the child witness will suffer severe mental and emotional to the
harm"
before keeping the defendant from the room where the child is testifying.
N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 65.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1989). If such a finding
is made, the
defendant must be on the monitor the child is watching. Id. at
§ 65.30(2); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(2), (3) (Supp. 1989) (for specific statutory
provisions see
supra note 249).
256. See supra note 6.
257. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
258. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1989).
259. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1989).
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A few statutes provide for two-way, closed-circuit television to
protect the child victim. 26° Typically, the child's testimony is broadcast
into the courtroom while a view of the courtroom is broadcast to the
child. Unlike the other statutes, two-way, closed-circuit television
permits a defendant to be outside the room where the child testifies
and still be able to be seen by the witness. Prior to Coy, any
requirement of face-to-face confrontation likely would have been
satisfied by merely projecting the defendant's image to the child.
After Coy, however, this is no longer the case. According to Justice
Scalia, the significance of the physical meeting was that it impressed
the conscience of the witness with the seriousness of the consequences. 261 That a child might be affected less emotionally by viewing
the circumvention
the defendant over a television monitor evidences
262 Thus, even in this case,
of the purpose behind literal confrontation.
a court must find a child's psychological health would be jeopardized
if required to testify while facing the defendant.
Both New York and California have elaborate child protection
statutes which permit the use of two-way, closed-circuit television.
New York requires the defendant to be in the broadcasting room
while the child testifies unless the court finds it to be dangerous to
263
the child's mental health. Here, again, statutes like New York's,
which mandate a finding of necessity before the defendant is seen
solely over the child's monitor, should pose no Coy-type problems
under a narrow interpretation. On the contrary, California does not
permit the defendant to be in the broadcasting room with the child,
requiring, instead, that the defendant's image be included on the
264
child's monitor of the courtroom. Although the California legislature appears to have considered a right to face-to-face confrontation,
the statute is probably unconstitutional. As demonstrated above, a
narrow interpretation of Coy will still demand some substantiation of
need even for procedures as protective of confrontation as California's.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Coy v. Iowa established that the confrontation clause requires
physical face-to-face confrontation between a criminal defendant and
CRIM. PROC.
260. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y.

§§ 65.00-65.30. (McKinney Supp. 1989).
261. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
262. See id.at 2802.
263. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp.
1989).
264. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
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any witnesses against him at trial. While there is little authoritative
or historical support for this holding, the Court reasoned that faceto-face confrontation is so fundamental to a fair accusation that
it
simply has been assumed to exist.
Despite suggestions in prior opinions to the contrary, the Court
described the right to face-to-face confrontation as more important
than the right to cross-examination. The language granting the faceto-face requirement great prestige in the realm of confrontation rights,
could lead to the conclusion that the right is so vital to the defendant's
fair trial that it can never be infringed. This interpretation would
cripple the states' attempts to protect child witnesses through videotaping and closed-circuit transmission of their testimony. The numerous statutes which protect a child witness by obstructing his view
of
the defendant would largely be unconstitutional.
Despite sweeping language of the important role of the face-toface meeting, the Coy opinion does contain limiting language. The
Court's brief references to the confrontation clause's requirement
of
necessity could be used to narrow the scope of Coy. Under a narrow
interpretation, circumvention of the face-to-face requirement would
require a court to find the procedure necessary to protect the witness'
emotional health. This would permit states to protect the vulnerable
child witnesses by videotaping their testimony or broadcasting it
into
the courtroom from another room when it could be shown necessary
to use such measures.
Whatever its future application may be, Coy will almost certainly
have a chilling impact on the use of shielding devices. A trial court,
confronted with the significance the majority placed on the right
to
face-to-face confrontation, unfortunately will hesitate in choosing
whose rights to protect-those of the child or the criminal defendant.
JANET

D. GLICK

